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THE RIGHT TO A MINIMALLY ADEQUATE
EDUCATION FOR LEARNING DISABLED
CHILDREN
By Rosalie Levinson
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade an increasing number of state educational
agencies have incorporated the category "learning disabled" into
their special education-programs.' The emergence of this group and
their fight for equal educational opportunity is part of a greater
movement that has emerged on behalf of all handicapped children in
this country. Although much has been written about the mentally
retarded and the physically, handicapped, the plight of the learning
disabled has been largely ignored. The term-often misused in
reference to educationally handicapped children generally-refers to
a specific category of exceptional children who though of normal in-
tellingence are unable to realize their potential in the average
school setting.2 Learning disabled children face especially difficult
problems because of their low visibility in society (they are often
classified as "slow-learners" or "behavior-problems") and because of
the fact that their handicap has only recently received the attention
of educators. This article will identify this group and inform the ad-
vocate of the constitutional rights which arguably may be asserted
on their behalf. The analysis will then proceed to explore recent
federal legislation which, although not devoid of significant gaps,
does specifically recognize the learning disabled and offers much
hope for their cause.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although the focus of this paper will be on the learning disabled,
it is necessary to briefly examine the history of educationally han-
dicapped children generally to better understand this new move-
ment and to build upon the progress that has been made on behalf
1. Gillespie, Miller and Fielder, Legislative Definitions of Learning
Disabilities: Roadblocks to Effective Service, 8 JOURNAL OF LEARNING DISABILITIES 660
(1975), notes that by 1969 two-thirds of the states had legislated some services to the
learning disabled.
2. T. BYRAN AND J. BYRAN, UNDERSTANDING LEARNING DISABLITIES 89 (1975).
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of other groups of handicapped children. Although the importance of
education is not a novel concept in this country, it was only recently
deemed necessary that educationally handicapped children par-
ticipate in the educational system. It was not until the last decade
that courts and legislatures began to reject the policy of excluding
handicapped children from a public education. As recently as 1958
the Illinois Supreme Court held that existing legislation did not re-
quire the state to provide a free educational program as a part of
the school system, for mentally deficient children.8 Until 1969 the
state of North Carolina actually made it a misdemeanor for a parent
to demand placement for a handicapped child.' Rather than face the
problem, early legislative solutions were simply to exclude the han-
dicapped from compulsory education laws; and since they were not
in the schools, educators were not faced with the task of developing
special education techniques. As one authority described:
Educational programs for those persons with mental, emo-
tional or psychological handicaps lagged far behind the
significant advances made in general educational program-
ming. For many years there were no educational strategies
at all for teaching persons with mental handicaps.
Educators had neither learned nor sought to learn the
techniques of educating such persons.'
It was not until the fifties and sixties that special education pro-
grams began to grow. In 1948 only 1,500 school districts in the coun-
try reported that they were operating some type of special educa-
tion program. Within ten years that number more than doubled to
3,600; and by 1963 it had increased to 5,600.
3. Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 Ill. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265 (1958).
See also Stick, The Handicapped Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55
NEB. L. REv. 637, 642-3 (1976).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-65 (1966), and N.C. GEN. STAT § 115-65 (Supp.
1974).
Several states still have laws permitting the exclusion of handicapped children
from full participation in school programs. For example, Nevada excludes a child
whose "physical or mental condition or attitude is such as to prevent or render inad-
visable his attendance at school or his application to study." NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.050
(1967). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-201, 79-202
(Reissue 1971); S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1975).
5. Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment. The Qualifications of Handicap-
ped Persons as a 'Suspect Class' Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 855, 871 (1972).
6. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded; Some Critical Issues, 48
N.D. LAw. 133, 166 n.125 (1972).
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The Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education7
provided the impetus for this dramatic growth, because from that
decision emerged the right to an education for all children.
Educators hailed the decision as having established the right to
equal educational opportunity not only for blacks but for all disad-
vantaged children.' By the late 1960's the trend requiring school
districts to educate the handicapped had been firmly established. In
1971, 899 bills promoting the education of the handicapped were in-
troduced in state legislatures -237 of these were enacted into law.,
By 1972 forty percent of the states had enacted laws mandating
educational programs for the handicapped; 0 by 1974, thirty-six right-
to-education lawsuits had been filed and were either pending or con-
cluded in twenty-five states.1 Today, approximately thirty-five
states have concluded either judicially or statutorily that educa-
tional programs for the mentally handicapped are required by law. 2
This new wave of interest has been attributed to Brown and its
progeny of desegregation cases. In addition, the sixties marked a
shift in professional attitudes toward the handicapped and an in-
crease in the number of advocates asserting their rights. The
educator's emerging attitude, referred to as the "zero reject" con-
cept, basically states that all handicapped persons can learn,
develop, and benefit from appropriate educational programs." This
meant that programs had to be developed for the estimated
1,750,000 handicapped individuals of school age who as of 1975 were
totally excluded from public school educational programs. It also
came to mean that something had to be done for the 2,200,000 han-
dicapped pupils attending the schools, but not being provided with
special programs suited to their needs. 5
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Weintraub and Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped
Children, 23 SYRACUSE U.L. REv. 1037 (1972).
9. Casey, The Supreme Court and the Suspect Class, 40 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 119, 121 (1973).
10. Weintraub and Abeson, Appropriate Education For All Handicapped
Children, 23 SYRACUSE U.L. REv. 1037, 1051 (1972).
11. Abeson, Movement and Momentum: Government and the Education of Han-
dicapped Children II, 41 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 114 (1974).
12. A list of key cases appear in Stick, The Handicapped Child Has a Right to
an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REv. 637, 639 n.5 (1976). A survey of applicable
state statutes appears in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1444-45.
13. See Gilhool, Education: An Inalienable Right, 39 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
597 (1973).
14. Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicap-
ped Persons as a 'Suspect Class' Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 855, 876 (1972). See also Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pa., 343 F.
Supp. 279, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
15. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975).
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The majority of learning disabled children fit into this latter
category. Although generally present in the classroom, without
special help they are in effect constructively excluded from the
educational process. Despite the growth of right-to-education laws,
very little has been done to. assure that learning disabled children
receive an appropriate education.
WHO ARE THE LEARNING DISABLED?
Although the term "learning disability" is a new one in educa-
tional spheres, the problem is ancient. At least three thousand years
ago the Egyptians demonstrated some awareness of the causal rela-
tionship between brain injury and impairments in speech and
memory." The concept of learning disability dates back to the 1860's
and 1870's, but it really was not until the 1960's that professional
literature began to reflect concern for learning disabled children.17
This came as a result of two key events. First was the formation of
a parent organization, the Association for Children with Learning
Disabilities (ACLD) in 1963 which has exerted a great amount of
pressure on the schools and legislatures. Second was the creation a
few years later of a Division for Children with Learning Disabilities
within the professional organization known as the Council for Excep-
tional Children. 8 The latter step provided the formal confirmation of
this new field of education.
Until 1963 professional literature spoke of dyslexia, reading
disabilities, perceptual handicaps and minimal brain injury. 9 But it
was Samuel Kirk who at a 1963 conference for perceptually han-
dicapped children gave birth to the ACLD and to the field of learn-
ing disabilities.' In the mid-sixties the National Society for Crippled
Children and Adults organized three task forces to determine who
these children are and what types of services they need. The task
proved to be an extremely difficult one due to the lack of consensus
among educators as to the composition of this group as well as the
16. G. GREGERSON, HISTORICAL AND FUTURE TRENDS IN LEARNING DISABILITIES
CONFERENCE ON LEARNING DISABILITIES: A REVIEW OF INDIANA'S RULE S-1 4-7 (1975).
17. D. HALLAHAN AND S. KAUFFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO LEARNING DISABILITIES 20
(1976) [hereinafter cited as D. HALLAHAN]; T. BRYAN AND J. BRYAN, UNDERSTANDING
LEARNING DISABILITIES 13-30 (1975).
18. L. MANN, L. GOODMAN AND J. WIEDERHOLT, TEACHING THE LEARNING DISABL-
ED ADOLESCENT 15 (1978), notes that this division is now the largest in CEC.
19. In 1968 one authority found 43 terms in the literature to describe children
exhibiting characteristics usually attributed to the learning disabled. See Gillespie,
supra note 1, 660.
20. L. Mann, supra note 18, at 14.
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proper diagnostic tools needed to identify learning disabled children. 1
Unfortunately, identification of the learning disabled proved
to be more difficult than identifying the blind, the deaf, the severely
retarded, or the physically handicapped.
Despite disagreement as to who are the learning disabled at
least four major aspects consistently emerge in all discussions.' A
learning disabled child generally has (1) academic retardation, (2) an
uneven pattern of development, (3) oftentimes central nervous
system dysfunctioning, although emphasis has shifted away from
brain damage to behavioral characteristics" and (4) learning prob-
lems which cannot be attributed to either environmental disadvan-
tage, mental retardation or emotional disturbance."' Although all
suggested definitions make it clear that the term "learning
disabled" encompasses more than one narrow type of problem, all
learning disabled children share one predominant trait: a significant
educational discrepancy between expected academic performance
and actual academic achievement.' Though of normal or potentially
normal intelligence, the learning disabled child simply cannot inter-
pret what he hears or sees in the same way as a child of equal in-
tellectual ability. He finds himself unable to understand, assimilate,
interpret or retain the speech of others. He may develop language
disorders or difficulties engaging in abstract thinking. In summary,
he suffers from a gap in psychological processes which renders futile
the methods used in the regular classroom.
The National Advisory Committee on Handicapped Children
21. Generally, the art of testing handicapped children remains in a nascent
stage. See Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Stu-
dent Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705, 711-12 (1973); Krass, The Right to Public
Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL.
L.F. 1016, 1021-23 (1976); Gillespie, supra note 1.
22. D. HALLAHAN, supra note 17, at 20. See also T. BRYAN AND J. BRYAN.
UNDERSTANDING LEARNING DISABLIEs 39-43 (1975).
23. Professionals infer brain injury because seventy to eighty per cent of all
disabled children exhibit "soft signs"- behavioral indicators-of mild neurological im-
pairment. Also, eighty to one hundred per cent of learning disabled children have ab-
normal electroencephalograms. One widely believed theory is that learning disabilities
are caused by damage to the central nervous system before or during the birth pro-
cess, or by disease during the child's early life. See L. FADELY AND G. DEBRoTA. LEARN-
ING DISABILITIES, CONFERENCE ON LEARNING DISABLTES: A REVIEW OF INDIANA'S RULE
S-1 36-41 (1975).
24. D. HALLAHAN. supra note 17.
25. T. BRYAN AND J. BRYAN, UNDERSTANDING LEARNING DISABILEs 89 (1975).
This trait becomes the cornerstone of the new federal regulations dealing with
children with specific learning disabilities. 42 FED. REG. 65083 § 121a.541 (1977).
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came up with the following definition of learning disabled children in
1968:
Children with special learning disabilities exhibit a
disorder in one or more of the basic psychological pro-
cesses involved in understanding or in using spoken or
written language.
These may be manifested in disorders of listening,
thinking, talking, reading, writing, spelling or arithmetic.
They include conditions which have been referred to
as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain
dysfunction, dyslexia, developmental aphasia, etc.
They do not include learning problems which are due
primarily to visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, to mental
retardation, emotional disturbance or to environmental
deprivation."
Thus, the definition of learning disabled children proves to be
more one of exclusion than inclusion. Yet despite its ambiguity and
operational problems, this definition has been adopted in both state
and federal laws as the only acceptable description in light of pre-
sent knowledge regarding learning disabled children.
This lack of precision has resulted in prevalence estimates
which are the most diverse of all of the categories of exceptional
children. The National Advisory Committee in their 1968 report
estimated that one to three per cent of all school age children are
learning disabled." Estimates made by specialists, however, range
from ten to fifteen per cent or higher depending on the precise
definition and method of assessment used." Adopting the more con-
servative figures, the state and federal governments have generally
assumed a one or two per cent incidence rate within the school age
population for the purpose of providing guidelines for planning and
funding educational programs for the learning disabled.
26. This definition was incorporated into the Children With Specific Learning
Disabilities Act of 1969, and the Elementary and Secondary Educational Amendments
of 1969. In addition the majority of state laws employ this NACHC definition either
verbatim or with slight modifications. See Gillespie, supra note 1, at 662.
27. D. HALLAHAN, supra note 17.
28. R. BRUININKS, G. GLAMAN AND C. CLARK, PREVALENCE OF LEARNING
DISABILITIES: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RESEARCH REPORT #20 (U. Minn. 1971).
See also [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2837-38 (noting a "conservative" three per
cent incidence of learning disability); T. BRYAN AND J. BRYAN, UNDERSTANDING LEARN-
ING DISABILITIES 8 (1975).
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Today the education laws of practically every state include the
category learning disabilities, focusing thus far on providing ser-
vices to children with the most severe handicaps." Yet even this
group is clearly not receiving help. Despite the strides that have
been made legislatively and judicially for handicapped children,
fewer than one-half of the school districts in the United States have
established programs for learning disabled children.8 These children
are left undiagnosed or misdiagnosed, despite all the landmark cases
and laws establishing the school's legal duty to educate all handicap-
ped children. The role of the advocate is still critical in seeing that
the rights of these children are asserted so that programs will be
developed and implemented to provide them with an appropriate
education.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN APPROPRIATE EDUCATION
The importance of an education has been asserted by numerous
decisions handed down by the Supreme Court over the years."' It
has been argued that although not explicitly found in the Constitu-
tion, the right to an education is implicit and must be safeguarded in
order to protect the enumerated rights of free speech and to par-
ticipation in the electoral process.u A holding that the right to an
education is fundamental could easily be supported by prior case
law. The rights to privacy," to procreate,M to travel,' and to have
access to the criminal justice system" are no more explicit in the
29. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 662.
30. G. GREGERSON, supra note 16. It has been shown statistically that as of the
1976-77 school year, 128 of the 305 school corporations in Indiana had no approved pro-
gram for learning disabled children, despite a 1973 state deadline requiring such pro-
grams. See Answers to Interrogatories submitted in Durbin v. Negley, C.A. S-76-72
(N.D. Ind., Filed May 18, 1976).
31. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230
(1963); Illinois ex. reL McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See
also Gammon, Equal Protection of the Law and San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 11 VAL. U.L. REv. 435, 458-9 n.74 (1977); Handel, The Role of the
Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective Minimal Educa-
tion, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 362-4 (1975).
32. Justice Brennan spoke of the inextricable link of education to these freedoms
in his dissent to San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 62-3
(1973).
33. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497 (1965).
34. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
35. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
36. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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Constitution and yet the Supreme Court has accorded them great
constitutional weight. As one authority recently noted, "A right to
divorce or abort a fetus would not universally be accepted as more
basic than the right to housing or an education, nor can either the
former or latter be said to be expressly provided for in the Constitu-
tion."s' Thus the absence of the words "right to education" in the
Constitution does not negate the existence nor the fundamentality
of such a right. The link between education and the first amendment
is apparent. The right to free speech is meaningless unless a person
can express himself intelligently. The corollary right to receive in-
formation "becomes little more than a hollow privilege" when a reci-
pient can neither read nor assimilate the communication." Yet this
is precisely the situation in which many learning disabled children
find themselves in the regular school setting, since they can only ac-
quire basic communication skills if provided with special instruction
tailored to their particular learning systems. The right to an educa-
tion is also critical to full participation in the rights and duties of
citizenship, including access to the political sytem.' These concepts
are best articulated by the Supreme Court's famous words in
Brown:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments. Compulsory school atten-
dance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of educa-
tion to our democratic society. It is required in the perfor-
mance of our most basic public responsibilities .... It is
the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a prin-
cipal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opporutnity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms."
37. Gammon, supra note 31, at 435, 457.
38. See arguments raised in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S.
367, 389-90 (1969), which generally discusses the right to receive information as an
essential part of the first amendment's protection.
39. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943), and
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940), which link education with
full participation in the rights and duties of citizenship.
40. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1978], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss2/2
RIGHT TO A MINIMAL EDUCATION
This oft-cited quotation lends strong support to the arguments being
made on behalf of learning disabled children.
Equal Educational Opportunity
Brown has been critical in establishing the fundamentality of
education for purposes of equal protection analysis." Brown man-
dates that once a state undertakes to provide an education, it must
do so "on equal terms."'" This concept of equal educational oppor-
tunity formed the basis of several lawsuits over the past decade. In
the landmark decision of Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" (P.A.R.C.), the court
found that children have a constitutionally protected right to an
education, and that no child can be excluded from a free publicly
supported educatjon by reason of a handicapping condition. In Oc-
tober, 1971, after several court hearings, the suit was tentatively
settled, with final ratification occurring in May, 1972. To provide
judicial supervision, the court appointed a special educator and an
attorney as special masters to oversee implementation of the iden-
tification and placement aspects of the agreement. The court also re-
tained jurisdiction to assure compliance with all terms." Although
the case was brought on behalf of only retarded children, the deci-
sion was important in asserting a new role for the courts to play on
behalf of handicapped children."
Inspired by the P.A.R.C. decision, three public interest legal
organizations brought suit on behalf of all school age children denied
their rights to "equal education opportunity" and due process."
41. Several post Brown cases, in both the state and federal courts, interpreted
the decision as having established the fundmentality of the right to an education. See,
e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Millikin v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1973);
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
42. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
43. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (court's interim orders approving the
original consent agreement of Oct. 7, 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (final
consent agreement and stipulation).
44. 343 F. Supp. at 315.
45. For full discussion of the P.A.R.C. decision, see Stick, The Handicapped
Child Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REv. 637. 646-50 (1976), and
Kuriloff, True, Kirp and Buss, Legal Reform and Educational Change: The Penn-
sylvania Case, 41 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 35 (1974).
46. Although due process procedures have been an important issue in the fight
for a minimally adequate education, a separate discussion of those procedures is
beyond the intended scope of this article. For more on due process and the right to
minimally adequate education, see Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicap-
ped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1027-33 (1976);
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Noting that lack of funds was no excuse for the denial of constitu-
tional rights, the court in Mills v. Board of Education of the Dist. of
Columbia,"' ordered the defendant to provide each child "a free and
suitable publicly supported education regardless of the degree of the
child's mental, physical, or emotional disability or impairment.""
The decision was important in its rejection of the state's lack of fund-
ing argument, and also in its expansion of the P.A.R.C. ruling to in-
clude all children excluded from school because of mental,
behavioral, emotional or physical handicaps. The court refused in-
itially to appoint a special master, but it did promise to intervene in
the event of delay or inaction in implementing the judgment or
decree." In 1975 a special master was appointed and on August 5,
1977, the judge, still dissatisfied with any implementation plan,
ordered the school district to submit a plan to the U.S. Commis-
sioner of Education, which, if approved, would finally terminate the
five year old suit.5
Strengthened by these two critical decisions, several lawsuits
were initiated to challenge state funding schemes that failed to pro-
vide "equal educational opportunity" to children in poor school
districts. In Serrano v. Priest,"1 Robinson v. Cahil" and Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield," both state and federal lower courts concluded
that education was a fundamental interest and that disparities in
educational expenditures did violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
The Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education
This line of cases came to an abrupt halt with the Supreme
Court's 5-4 decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Abeson, A Primer of Due Process: Education Decisions for Exceptional Children, 42
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 68 (1975); Diamond, The Constitutional Right to Education:
The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1973). Note too that many due process
questions have been settled by recent federal legislation. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415
(1977) (The Education for All Handicapped Children Act); J5 C.F.R. § 84.36 (1977)
(regulations promulgated under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). See also Children Re-
quiring Special Education: New Federal Requirements, CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 462
(1977).
47. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
48. Id. at 878.
49. Id. at 877.
50. For a study of the implementation problems in P.A.R.C. and Mills, see
Kirp, Buss and Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education, Empirical Studies and
Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40 (1974).
51. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
52. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
53. 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
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Rodriguez." Rodriguez held that education is not a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution, and thus a legislative classifica-
tion which allegedly interferes with this interest need not satisfy
the "strict scrutiny" test."
The plaintiffs in Rodriguez attacked the constitutionality of
Texas' school financing scheme, alleging that it discriminated
against students from poor school districts. Plaintiffs argued that
because the school districts were financed partly from local property
taxes, poor school districts were not receiving the same amount of
funds per pupil as the wealthier districts and, therefore, children in
poor districts were not being provided with an education equal to
that of children in wealthier districts. However, the problem of
whether there is a right to the equal opportunity to obtain an ade-
quate education was not at issue in Rodriguez because the parties
agreed that all children in Texas were already receiving an ade-
quate education pursuant to Texas' Minimum Foundation Program
of Education." Rather, the question presented in Rodriguez was
whether the state had the duty to insure the equal opportunity to
obtain something over and above an adequate education. The Court
refused to engage in the task of measuring the comparative "ade-
quacy" of an education based simply on per capita expenditures. 7
The Court also was reluctant to strictly scrutinize a system of finan-
cing public education which the Court noted was then in existence in
virtually every state" and which involved a tax revenue question
"traditionally deferred to state legislatures. 5
Soon after the decision was handed down, experts were quick
to warn that Rodriguez should not be viewed as an obstacle to the
movement for handicapped children." Justice Powell was merely
unable and unwilling to find that any fundamental right was being
abridged where plaintiffs were already being given the opportunity
to acquire "the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of free speech and of full participation in the political pro-
cess." Justice Powell specifically left open the question of whether
54. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
55. For a critical review of the Court's two-tier approach to equal protection,
see Gammon, Equal Protection of the Law and San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez 11 VAL. U.L. REv. 435 (1977).
56. 411 U.S. at 24, 37.
57. Id. at 43.
58. Ild. at 17.
59. Id. at 40.
60. See Casey, The Supreme Court and the Suspect Class, 40 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 119 (1973); Comment Lau v. Nichols, 62 CAL. L. REv. 157 (1974).
61. 411 U.S. at 37.
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children deprived of a minimally adequate educational program are
being denied a fundamental right:
Whatever merit appellee's argument might have if a
state's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of
educational opportunities to any of its children, that argu-
ment provides no basis for finding an interference with
fundamental rights where only relative differences in
spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the rights of speech and of full participation in
the political process. [Emphasis added.]62
Rodriguez does not totally undermine Brown's promise of equal
educational opportunity. The Court held that there is no fundamen-
tal right to equal per pupil expenditures and that Texas' financing
scheme did satisfy the less demanding rational basis test. The Court
did not decide the question of whether the opportunity to acquire a
minimally adequate education is so fundamental as to warrant im-
position of the strict scrutiny standard. Under the latter test the
state would bear the burden of proving that its educational program
which denied opportunity to learning disabled children furthered
some compelling state interest which could not be accomplished in
any less drastic manner. As the Court noted in Rodriguez, under the
strict scrutiny test "the state must demonstrate that its educational
system has been structured with 'precision,' and is 'tailored' narrow-
ly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the 'less
drastic means' for effectuating its objectives.""
Thus despite the Court's refusal to certify education as a fun-
damental right, subsequent cases have been successful in
distinguishing the decision and denying its application to handicap-
ped children asserting lack of the opportunity to acquire a minimally
adequate education.
The question of what constitutes a minimally adequate educa-
tion is a difficult one. Handicapped children are arguing that the
system fails to provide them with basic minimal skills. And although
most learning disabled children are not actually barred from attend-
ing school, they are being constructively excluded from a public
education. The regular education they receive is often worthless and
62. Id
63. Id at 16-17.
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even detrimental to their psychological and emotional well-being.
The Supreme Court in a post-Rodriguez decision suggests that the
question of whether a state is providing a minimally adequate educa-
tional opportunity must be measured from the viewpoint of the reci-
pient. In Lau v. Nichols," non-English speaking Chinese students,
who were being taught solely in English, claimed they were being
denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in the State's educa-
tional program in violation of § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Constitution." Although not reaching the constitutional
issue, the Court recognized that: "there is no equality of treatment
merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks,
teachers and curriculum; for students who do not understand
English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education. " "
Thus, the Supreme Court found that equality in educational op-
portunity must be measured in terms of the effect on the student
based on his needs. Just as a child who is blind or deaf or unable to
speak English is being constructively excluded from a state's educa-
tional system by being placed in a regular classroom setting, similar-
ly the child who is learning disabled and incapable of decoding in-
coming messages cannot be expected to derive even a minimally
adequate education without special assistance. The Lau decision sug-
gests that simply providing the same facilities to children who have
widely varying needs does not guarantee the equal opportunity to
acquire a minimally adequate education. Unless the adequacy of a
state's educational program is measured from the student's view-
point, that is, in terms of his ability to derive a basic education,
equality of educational opportunity will only be meaningful to nor-
mal children.
A few courts have already adopted this concept of constructive
exclusion from a minimally adequate education to distinguish
Rodriguez. In Frederick L. v. Thomas,7 children with specific learn-
ing disabilties claimed the right to a minimally adequate educational
opportunity and the equal right to an educational program adapted
to their needs, since normal and mentally retarded children were be-
ing provided with such programs. In denying defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court noted that Rodriguez
"left open the possibility that the denial of a minimally adequate
educational opportunity may entrench upon a fundamental interest
64. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
66. 414 U.S. at 566.
67. 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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if the state has undertaken to provide a free public education,"" and
that defendants' policies may have to be subjected to strict scrutiny.
In reaching the merits of the case in a subsequent proceeding, the
court held that the district had failed to meet its obligation under
state law. It granted relief in the form of both mandatory screening
of all pupils performing in the lowest percentiles on certain standar-
dized achievement tests and appropriate learning disability pro-
grams for all school age children." After further proceedings a
remedial order was issued appointing a master to oversee implemen-
tation of the plan and to submit final reports to the court. This land-
mark decision for learning disabled children was affirmed by the
Third Circuit, the court rejecting defendants' arguments that the
district court should have abstained and that the screening relief
was too broad.7' Noting that only 1,300 of a estimated 8,000 learning
disabled students in the school system had been identified, the court
held that screening was necessary to "isolate the entire population
of learning disabled students and to evaluate the need of these
pupils for special education services."'"
In a related special education case, Fialkowski v. Shapp,7'
Rodriguez was again held not to foreclose plaintiffs' constitutional
claims. The Fialkowski court found three key differences: (1) since
plaintiffs alleged a complete denial of educational opportunity, it
was "not inconsistent with Rodriguez to hold that there exists a con-
stitutional right to a certain minimum level of education as opposed
to a constitutional right to a particular level of education;" 7'' (2)
retarded children may be a suspect class and "depriving retarded
children of all educational benefits would appear to warrant greater
judicial scrutiny than that applied in Rodriguez,"" and (3) Rodriguez
dealt only with equal educational opportunity measured in terms of
equal financial expenditures, which was not the situation in the case
before the court."'
68. Id. at 835.
69. 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
70. 557 F.2d 373, 381-4 (3d Cir. 1977).
71. A discussion of abstention as it relates to education suits appears in Gor-
don, Public Instruction to the Learning Disable& Higher Hurdles for the Handicap-
ped, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 113, 124-26 (1973). Note also that the court in P.A.R.C., 343 F.
Supp. 279, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1972), specifically rejected an abstention argument. See also
Nickerson v. Thomson, 504 F.2d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1974); Usen v. Sepprell, 41 App. Div.
2d 251, 342 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1973) (no need to exhaust administrative remedies where no
adequate facilities were available).
72. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
73. Id. at 958.
74. Id. at 958-9.
75. Id. at 958.
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The application of one and three to learning disabled children
is clear. They too are alleging the denial of a minimally adequate
education and the right to equal educational opportunity in the con-
text of this minimum standard. The second distinguishing feature
recognized above merits further discussion, since either the finding
of a fundamental right or of a suspect class subjects a state system
to strict scrutiny.
One basis for the Court's denial of relief in Rodriguez was the
lack of an identifiable class of injured plaintiffs. The arguments used
by the Rodriguez Court for denying plaintiffs suspect class status
are not applicable to learning disabled children, as they can be iden-
tified through appropriate testing procedures and screened in accord-
ance with the statutory definition for learning disabilities provided
by both state and federal statutes. Moreover, several recent cases
support the theory that children with certain disabilities may con-
stitute a suspect class. In Fialkowski, the court said that the criteria
set out in Rodriguez for determining a suspect class "could certainly
be said to include retarded children," and that, in any event, depriv-
ing retarded children of educational benefits "would appear to war-
rant greater judicial scrutiny than that applied in Rodriguez.""
Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in grant-
ing relief to a handicapped child, noted that deprivation of a mean-
ingful education "would be just the sort of denial of equal protection
which has been held unconstitutional in cases involving discrimina-
tion based on race and illegitimacy."" Looking back to the history of
learning disabled children-the fact that they have historically
received unequal treatment in the public education system and that
they have branded with the stigma of being stupid or slow-the
suspect classification theory merits attention. In addition, unlike the
children in Rodriguez, the learning disabled are claiming the total
deprivation of a constitutionally protected fundamental right to a
minimally adequate education.
76. Id at 959. The indicia of suspectness were identified by Justice Powell in
Rodriguez: A class "saddled with disabilities," or "subject to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment," or "relegated to a position of political powerlessness." 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973). All of these indicia describe learning disabled children. See also Burgdorf, A
History of Unequal Treatment. The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a
'Suspect Class' Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 902
(1972); Casey, The Supreme Court and the Suspect Class, 40 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
119 (1973); Handel, The role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's
Rights to an Effective Minimal Education 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 364-5 (1975); Richards,
Comment- Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the Mentally Retard-
ed, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 554, 568-9 (1973).
77. Ex. Rel. G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1974).
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Finally it should be noted that the Supreme Court's usage in
Rodriguez of a very traditional undemanding rational basis test is
not binding on future courts dealing with the educationally han-
dicapped. Members of the Supreme Court have, over the past
decade, expressed disillusionment with a strict two-tier approach to
equal protection analysis, and decisions both before and after
Rodriguez illustrate the Court's adoption of an intermediate test.7'
Justice Marshall explained in his dissent to Rodriguez that the
Court has in reality applied a spectrum of standards depending "on
the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which
the particular classification is drawn."' Marshall stressed the impor-
tance of education and its inextricable link to the rights of free
speech and association and to participation in the electoral process.
Marshall said that as the nexus between specific constitutional
guarantees and a nonconstitutional interest draws closer, "the non-
constitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of
judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a
discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly."'0 Further, in the
recent case of Zablocki v. Redhai l, Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, said that evaluations under the equal protection clause
must be based on "the nature of the classification and the individual
interests affected."'" Marshall explained that since the right involv-
ed [the right to marry] was of fundamental importance and the in-
terference with the exercise of that right was significant, "critical
examination of the state interests" was required.0 Conceding that
not all interferences with the right to marry must be subjected to
rigorous scrutiny, Marshall stressed the fact that the interference in
that case was both direct and substantial." Similarly, while
Rodriguez made it clear that not all interferences with the right to
an education must be subjected to strict scrutiny, the denial of a
minimally adequate education for learning disabled children con-
stitutes a direct substantial interference "sufficient to warrant
critical examination" of a state's educational program.
78. See Gammon, supra note 31, at 463; Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model for a
New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1972); Comment, Lau v. Nichols, 62
CALIF. L. Rv. 157, 167 (1974).
79. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973).
80. Id. at 102-3.
81. Zablocki v. Redhail, __ U.S. __,98 S. Ct. 673 (1978).
82. Id. at 679.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 681.
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Other Supreme Court decisions illustrate that the Court is re-
jecting application of a rigid two-tier approach and that it is adding
new bite to the traditional equal protection standard." There is no
reason to view Rodriguez as anything more than an exception to
this trend, which can be explained by the Court's traditional reluc-
tance to intervene in a state revenue matter or to overhaul a school
financing system firmly established in practically all the states." In
one post-Rodriguez decision, Weinberger v. Wesenfeld, the
Supreme Court, without finding a suspect class or fundamental
right, noted that even if legislative discrimination could be rational-
ly explained, it must nevertheless withstand scrutiny in light if the
primary purposes of the legislative scheme."
In Frederick L. v. Thomas" the court rejected application of
the traditional rationality standard to learning disabled children. It
did so both because the case involved education, a "quasi-
fundamental right," and because it involved learning disabled
children, a group which exhibits several of the essential
characteristics of a suspect class. The court, therefore, felt that a
strict rationality or intermediate test of equal protection was re-
quired. At the very least, the defendants had to show "that their ac-
tions have a basis in fact which rationally advances an actual pur-
pose of the legislative scheme.""
Indeed, even using "minimal scrutiny," it is difficult to see any
rational basis for a state denying equal educational opportunity to
the learning disabled." The traditional rational basis test still man-
dates that a state classification have a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest. If no rational basis exists or if the state in-
85. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (striking down a sec-
tion of the Social Security Act as sexually discriminatory); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975) (striking down state residency requirements for divorce); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173-5 (1972) (striking down the denial of workmen's compensa-
tion to dependent, unacknowleged, illegitimate children); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (striking down a probate statute giving mandatory preference to males, in let-
ters of administration). The Court found the classification in each of these cases un-
constitutional without finding a suspect class or a fundamental right.
86. See p. - of this text.
87. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
88. Id. at 648-653, 648 n.16 (1975). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (in which the "purpose" of the challenged
legislation was carefully examined by the Court).
89. 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
90. Id. at 835.
91. See Falkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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terest is not legitimate, the classification is violative of the equal
protection clause."
Fiscal Concerns Do Not Justify the Denial of the Right to a
Minimally Adequate Education
The reason most often given for unequal access to educational
opportunity for learning disabled and for other handicapped children
is the higher cost of special education." Costs are greater for
salaries and equipment and per child costs increase due to smaller
class size and the need for ancillary personnel, including
psychometrists, speech clinicians, and certified learning disabilities
teachers. It is estimated that the $700 a year needed to educate a
non-handicapped child jumps to $1,500 to educate the handicapped
child in a school setting." Although federal funding is starting to off-
set the cost of educating learning disabled children, the state still
bears the primary burden."
Fiscal concern, however, is not a legitimate reason for denying
a substantial portion of the nation's school age the right to par-
ticipate in the educational process in a meaningful way. First, as the
court noted in Mills v. Board of Education," if funding is a problem
there must be restructuring of the budget and school finances must
be equitably distributed so that no child is denied a minimally ade-
quate education. As the court noted, "The inadequacies of the
District of Columbia Public School System whether occasioned by in-
sufficient funding or adminstrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be
permitted to bear more heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped
child than on the normal child."'" Another authority characterized
the funding problem as one of improper priorities, noting that many
noncritical items in a school budget such as music and art, which
although obviously worthwhile, should not take priority over
reading, writing and other basic education for handicapped
children." The irrationality of this system of priorities is further il-
92. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
93. Thomas, Finance: Without Which There i8 No Special Education, 40 EXCEP-
TIONAL CHILDREN 475 (1973).
94. Benjamin, Implementation of Education Law, Relating to Exceptional
Children: The Maine Experience, CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 449, 454 (1977).
95. Questions of federal funding discussed infra -.
96. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
97. Id. at 876. See also Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1283
(D.N.M. 1972).
98. See Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's
Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 349. 366-7 (1975).
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lustrated by the fact that the school is in effect wasting $700 a year
or more on learning disabled children left in the regular classroom,
when many of these children, if taught to compensate for their
disability, could be achieving at the same or nearly the same level
as normal children." A comment made about the Lau decision is
equally applicable to learning disabled children: [iut is a travesty that
a school system which denies thousands of children an education
because of the unavailability of funding, continues to squander its
budget on classes in which students cannot understand the language
of instruction."'100 Further, in viewing the cost to society from a
broader perspective, fiscal concerns become less critical. In the case
of In re Downey"'0 a father was awarded $6,496 to pay the extra cost
of tuition and transportation to and from a special school since there
was no adequate public facility available. The court noted:
[WIhile at first blush this may seem like a substantial
outlay of funds for one child, when compared with the
dollar cost of maintaining a child in an institution all his
life or on public assistance the cost is minimal; not to
speak of the incalculable cost to society of losing a poten-
tially productive adult.'"
Although the likelihood of a learning disabled child ending up
in an institution is not great, such a child may very well drop out of
school and join the ranks of the unemployed and the recipients of
public aid. Studies have already begun to show a high correlation
between learning disabled children and school drop-outs. They have
also found a disproportionately high number of the learning disabled
among juvenile delinquents and criminals. For example, a 1965
survey of 277,649 juvenile arrests in California, found over 55,000
children evidencing symptoms of learning disabilities.'" The study
99. See Benjamin, supra note 94.
100. Gordon, Public Instruction to the Learning Disabled: Higher Hurdles for
the Handicapped 8 U.S.F. L. REv. 113, 145 (1973).
101. 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1973).
102. Id. at 690. The same argument has been made for years with regard to men-
tally retarded children. That is, it costs society more not to educate such children as
the cost of institutionalization far exceeds the cost of education. The 1972 Report of
the President's Committee on Mental Retardation estimates that three-fourths of all
non-institutionalized mentally retarded persons dependent on public assistance could
be fully self-supporting if educated and trained. See Murdock, Civil Rights of the Men-
tally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48 N.D. LAW. 133, 164-5 (1972); Richards, Com-
menL Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the Mentally Retarded, 34
O11o ST. L.J. 554, 559-60 (1973).
103. L. TARNOPOL. Delinquency and Learning Disabilities in LEARNING
DIsABILITIs. INTRODUCTION TO EDUCATIONAL AND MEDICAL MANAGEMENT (1967).
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revealed that such children are often unable to read by fourth or
fifth grade and, consequently, drop out of school. Their lack of
education, coupled with their emotional problems, often leads them
to juvenile delinquency.'
Experts similarly testified in the Frederick L. case that learn-
ing disabled children who are forced to sit in classrooms without be-
ing able to understand the lessons taught suffer grave injury to
their emotional and psychological conditions. Failure causes frustra-
tion, loss of self-esteem and antagonism towards adults. Such
testimony led the court to conclude that "inappropriate educational
placements predictably lead to severe frustration and to other emo-
tional disturbances which impede the learning process and erupt in-
to anti-social behavior." '' 1 In addition, studies indicate that the learn-
ing disabled child is likely to be rejected or in conflict with parents,
teachers and peers.'"
Such results are not at all surprising in light of the fact that
learning disabled children typically have average or above average
I.Q.'s and thus are acutely aware of and frustrated by the fact that
they cannot compete with their peers.1" Similar to the stigma
associated with racial separation recognized in Brownlu the early
effects of peer and parental rejection and failure in school will not
soon dissipate. Psychological harm, which was presumed in Brown,
is arguably no less certain to occur to the learning disabled child
who remains unhelped. Thus, the cost of educating the learning
disabled becomes de minimus when balanced against the cost to
society of permitting these children to grow up frustrated, disillu-
sioned and hostile.
One final aspect to the cost question merits consideration. As
has already been suggested, special expenditures increase substan-
tially for the learning disabled child to reach the same or near
achievement level as the normal child. If equality in education were
to be measured in terms of per capita expenditures, normal children
could then sue for equal rights. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez
104. See L. MANN, L. GOODMAN, J. WEIDERHOLT, TEACHING THE LEARNING DISABL-
ED ADOLESCENT 61 (1978); F. JACOBSON. Learning Disabilities and Juvenile Delinquen-
cy: A Demonstrated Relationship, HANDBOOK ON LEARNING DISABILITIES (1974).
105. See 419 F. Supp. 960, 962-5 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 557 F.2d 373, 375 (3d Cir.
1977).
106. See L. MANN, L. GOODMAN. J. WEIDERHOLT, TEACHING THE LEARNING DISABL-
ED ADOLESCENT 59-85 (1978).
107. T. BRYAN & J. BRYAN, UNDERSTANDING LEARNING DISABILITIES 121 (1975).
108. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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fortunately rejected the notion that equality should be measured by
per pupil expenditures. When the issue is framed in terms of the
minimally adequate education that is granted to normal children and
denied to the learning disabled, the true victims of discrimination
become apparent. What is required is neither dollar equality nor
even outcome equality. As one authority noted, "Since the school is
providing or attempting to provide a minimally adequate education
for regular children, equal protection requires that they do the same
for handicapped children, even though the definition of minimally
adequate education will differ for these children.""'
Several lower court decisions have rejected this fiscal argu-
ment as insufficient to sustain an equal protection challenge. In
Kruse v. Cambel 110 the court held unconstitutinal a partial tuition
grant program for handicapped children attending private schools
where no public educational programs were available. Since children
whose parents could not afford the proportioned costs were denied
"the opportunity to obtain the benefits of an appropriate education,"
the program was struck down as "violative of equal protection," the
court holding that such a denial "is irrational and fails to further
any legitimate state interest."'
The same result has been reached in state courts in cases
specifically involving learning disabled children. In Kivel v.
Nemoitin,"' the court, finding that the defendant failed to offer an
appropriate program for a twelve-year-old perceptually handicapped
child with learning disabilities, awarded the boy's mother $13,400 to
pay for the out-of-state private education he received for two years.
In another case, In re Held,' a Family Court judge in New York
similarly awarded plaintiffs the costs of private special education. In
the case a child suffering from organic brain syndrome had spent
five years in the public schools-three and one-half of them in
special education classes-making virtually no progress. At the age
109. McClung, Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to Minimum Ade-
quate Education, 3 J.L. Enuc. 153, 160 (1974).
110. 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va.), remanded 98 S. Ct. 38 (1977) (directions to
decide the claim based on § 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
111. 431 F. Supp. at 187.
112. No. 143913 (Super. Ct., Fairfield Co., Conn. 1972), discussed in Wientraub &
Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children. 23 SYRACUSE U.L. REv.
1037, 1050 (1972).
113. 66 Misc. 2d 1097, 323 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1971). The court also rejected the
school's allegation that the following year a proper program would be initiated, noting
that it would not permit the child's future "to be further jeopardized by gambling on a
special education system that has yet to prove itself." Id. at 305.
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of eleven years-one month, his reading level was that of an average
first-grade pupil. Yet after one year at a private school, the child
raised his reading level by two grades' thus proving that the child
was not provided with a minimally adequate education in the public
school system. The case acknowledges that it is insufficient for a
school to provide an education, if such does not achieve tangible
results.
New York has been one of the more progressive states in
recognizing the rights of learning disabled children. In addition to In
re Held, another case, In re Kirkpatrick,"' held that an adolescent
suffering from learning disabilties was entitled to special education
at an approved private facility due to the inadequacy of any public
program. Finally in Matter of Lofft,"' a New York Family Court
recently held that a special program held to be developed for a
brain damaged child suffering from neurological dysfunction. The
court specifically noted that the interests of the child and family
"must not be subordinated to agency claims of insufficient time,
staff, or funds,""' because "failing to provide an educational oppor-
tunity for such children would constitute a violation of both state
and federal constitutions.""' As to the latter, the court said that it
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
deny equal educational opportunity to handicapped children.
Thus courts in a few states are starting to recognize that
failure to provide learning disabled children with an appropriate
education violates fundamental federal constitutional rights, and
often violates state constitutional guarantees of a free public educa-
tion for all children."' One major effect of these right-to-education
lawsuits and court decisions has been the dynamic increase in con-
gressional attention to and support of education of the handicapped.
As a result of recently enacted federal law and regulations, han-
dicapped children can now point to detailed state statutory obliga-
tions and duties to support their claim to a minimally adequate
education. In addition, federal funds have been appropriated to help
the states meet their new obligations. The next section will explore
the impact of these laws on the learning disabled.
114. 77 Misc. 2d 646, 345 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1972).
115. 86 Misc. 2d 431, 383 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1976).
116. Id. at 145.
117. Id at 146.
118. Several state constitutions contain "free education for all" provisions. For
example, the Indiana Constitution, Art. 8, § 1, provides that a public education system
must be equally open to all students. Several states also have laws mandating special
education for the handicapped. See note 29 aupra and accompanying text.
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THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO AN APPROPRIATE EDUCATION
One of the key arguments opposing legal interference in the
educational sphere is that it is allegedly impossible for a court of
law to delineate the level of education a state must provide to a han-
dicapped child in order to satisfy the equal protection clause.11, ' In
addition, it is argued that education is a matter best left up to state
and local governments, which must work out their own financing
problems.'" Congress in the past few years has provided answers to
these arguments and has established as a national goal the educa-
tion of all handicapped children. New federal legislation has gone far
in providing a detailed description of what constitutes an ap-
propriate education for a handicapped child. In addition, the legisla-
tion demonstrates a serious national interest in the rights of this
group which removes this sphere from abstention or comity
arguments. Finally, federal legislation is starting to provide needed
funding to states which adopt the policy of providing special educa-
tion to all handicapped children, including the learning disabled.
The federal government's interest in special education did not
surface until 1965 when the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act"1 established a federal commitment to develop and improve
level educational programs for educationally deprived children. Title
I of the Act was amended in that year to provide financial
assistance to state programs or schools for the handicapped. Five
years later the Children With Learning Disabilities Act was passed,
creating grants for research and training centers to study the pro-
blems of learning disabled children." In addition, the centers were
to train educational personnel and develop new teaching methods
119. This type of argument has not stopped the courts from deciding other dif-
ficult questions outside their supposed area of expertise. For example, courts have
been willing to decide what constitutes appropriate treatment for institutionalized per-
sons. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, remanded
in part, rev'd in part sub nom, Wyatt v. Aderholt 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). For a
discussion of the similarities between the right to medical treatment suits and the
right to education suits, see Gordon, Public Instruction to the Learning Disable&
Higher Hurdles for the Handicapped, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 113, 122-23 (1973); Handel, The
Role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective
Minimal Education, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 368-70 (1975); McClung, Do Handicapped
Children Have a Legal Right to Minimum Adequate Education, 3 J.L. EDUC. 153, 162
(1974); Stick, The Handicapped Child has a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB.
L. REv. 637, 658, 670 (1976).
120. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4244 (1973).
121. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27; Pub. L. No. 89-313, 79 Stat. 1158.
122. See 20 U.S.C. § 1461 (1971).
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and techniques. The grants were inspired by a 1968 survey showing
that only twenty colleges in the United States offered any courses
on the education of learning disabled children.' Since that time con-
gressional attention has escalated dramatically, culminating in
detailed laws and regulations designed to protect the rights of the
handicapped. The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of
197514 and the Rehabilitation Act of 197311 promise to be effective
tools for vindicating the rights of these children. Basically they
assure that every state receiving federal money must guarantee
equal protection of the law to handicapped persons.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (E.A.H.C.A.)"
was signed into law on November 29, 1975. This legislation amends
and expands on Part B of Public Law 93-380' which provides finan-
cial assistance to states to identify, locate and evaluate all handicap-
ped children, to establish full educational opportunity for all han-
dicapped children, and to establish timetables for achieving these
goals. The Conference Report on the Act acknowledged that there
are more than eight million handicapped children in the United
States, more than half of whom are not receiving full equality of
educational opportunity.'" In addition to the one million children
totally excluded from the education system, the Act is aimed at
identifying and helping handicapped children presently in the
classroom. Recognizing the various types of handicapping conditions,
the Act requires that special education meet "the unique needs of a
handicapped child"1 " and that "individualized education programs"
be developed and reviewed for each child. 80 The law specifically
acknowledges the learning disabled in its definition of "handicapped
child." '' In addition, § 620b of the Act required the U.S. Commis-
123. [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2837-38.
124. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1978). This title was first introduced on May 16,
1972. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975). Parts took effect in 1975; the
remainder became effective on October 1, 1977.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1975).
126. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.
127. 88 Stat. 484.
128. S. REP. NO. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975).
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1978).
130. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(5) (1978). As argued in earlier cases, see supra
pp. - to __, an appropriate education is to be measured from the viewpoint of the
child.
131. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1978); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5 (1976). Also, 20 U.S.C. §
1401(15) (1978), defines "children with specific learning disabilities."
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sioner of Education to set down criteria to identify specific learning
disabilities as well as regulations to establish diagnostic and
monitoring procedures. To comply with this mandate, proposed rules
dealing exclusively with the learning disabled were issued on
November 29, 1976,1w and amended regulations were finalized on
December 29, 1977.18 3
Before discussing the latter regulations, it should be noted that
the learning disabled will benefit generally by the Act's mandate
that by September 1, 1978, a participating state must assure that all
handicapped children between the ages of three and eighteen are
provided "a free appropriate public education."'5 8 Since practically
all states have submitted state plans to the United States Commis-
sioner of Education, evidencing their intent to participate in the pro-
gram, the ramifications of such a mandate are clear.'" To achieve
this monumental task, the Act establishes a massive federal aid to
education program which will provide reimbursement for up to five
per cent of the excess costs for special education in the 1977-1978
school year and will gradually increase the amount of reimburse-
ment until the 1981-1982 school year when a maximum of forty per
cent of excess costs will be provided. 8
The quid pro quo for the monetary aid is that the state educa-
tional agency (1) provide each child with a free appropriate educa-
tion suited to his individual needs'87 (2) that certain procedural
safeguards be observed before, during, and after placement deci-
sions are made," and (3) that a method be developed for finding and
132. 41 Fed. Reg. 52404-7 (1976). The regulations mentioned supplemented the
regulations dealing with the new Act in general. See 42 Fed. Reg. 42473 (1977).
133. 42 Fed. Reg. 65082-5 (1977).
134. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(b) (1978).
135. As of February 1, 1978, only New Mexico had failed to submit a state plan.
The requirements for a state plan are set forth at 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (1978), and 45
C.F.R. § 121a.10 (1977).
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1) (1978).
137. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(18), 1412(1) (1978). The keynote of the Act is that an in-
dividualized educational program (IEP) be prepared for each handicapped child, based
on a conference, and that the program be reviewed annually. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(4),
1414(a)(5), 1401(19) (1978); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.342-46 (1977).
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1978). This section includes the important right to file a
complaint with the state or local educational agency regarding "any matter relating to
• .. the provision of a free appropriated public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E)
(1978). For elaboration on the grant of procedural rights under the Act, see Krass, The
Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children" A Primer for the New Advocate,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1067-71 (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.503-12 (1977).
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identifying handicapped children.'" The state plan must set forth in
detail how and when goals will be met, including a complete descrip-
tion of the kind and number of facilities, personnel and services
necessary throughout the state."'
Of special importance to the learning disabled child are the re-
quirements regarding testing. As mentioned earlier, the learning
disabled child is of average or above-average intelligence. However,
since most well-known and widely used intelligence tests measure a
child's present achievement rather than potential, a child with learn-
ing disabilities who has never received help will probably score
low."' Recognizing these difficulties, the Act requires that tests be
administered by trained personnel, that they be tailored "to assess
specific areas of educational need and not merely those which are
designed to provide a single general intelligence quotient," and that
"no single procedure is used as the sole criterion for determining an
appropriate educational program for a child."'"
In addition to these safeguards which apply to all handicapped
children, the learning disabled are protected by special regulations
drafted solely for their benefit. Criteria are set out for use by a
multi-disciplinary team, which includes the child's regular teacher,
qualified diagnosticians and specialists,'" to be used in determin-
ing the existence of a specific learning disability. Rejecting the
original proposal of using a set formula,'" the regulations require
a determination be based on (1) whether a child does not achieve
commensurate with his age and ability when provided with appro-
priate educational experiences and (2) whether the child has a
severe discrepancy between achievement and intellectual ability in
one or more of the seven areas relating to communication skills and
mathematical abilities set forth in the regulation.'" After much
heated debate, it was decided to delete the originally proposed "fifty
per cent" figure for determining "severe discrepancy." Abandon-
ment of the formula was due largely to the psychometric and
statistical inadequacy of the procedure, the fear of abuse of the for-
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C) (1978); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.10g (1976).
140. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2XA) (1978); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.125-26 (1977).
141. The relationship of intelligence tests to learning disabilities is discussed in
T. BRYAN AND J. BRYAN, UNDERSTANDING LEARNING DISABILITIES 91-106 (1975).
142. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5XC) (1978); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.530-34 (1977). See also 45
C.F.R. § 84.35(bX1) & (C) (1977).
143. 42 Fed. Reg. 65083 (1977) (to be codified as 45 C.F.R. § 121a.540).
144. See 41 Fed. Reg. 52406-7 (1976).
145. 42 Fed. Reg. 65083 (1977) (to be codified as 45 C.F.R. § 121a.541(a)).
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mula, and the inappropriateness of using a single formula for
children of all ages."'
After ascertaining that the aforementioned criteria are met,
the team must then conclude that the discrepancy is not the result
of a visual, hearing or motor handicap, mental retardation, emotional
disturbance or environmental, cultural or economic disadvantage."7
The use of this type of procedural approach is the best way of deal-
ing with the evaluation problem due to the variety of symptoms
that may be manifested by the learning disabled child.'" The final
safeguard is the requirement of a detailed written report which
must include findings, reasons for findings, relevant behavioral
observations, medical findings (if any), and whether there is a need
for special education and related services."" Finally, each team
member must certify in writing "whether the report reflects his or
her conclusion," and if it does not, a separate statement of conclu-
sions must be submitted.'" These procedural provisions coupled with
those required generally under the Act for evaluating handicapped
children should go far in eliminating problems of misdiagnosis and
mislabeling.
Perhaps the key relevance of the passage of these final regula-
tions is that their effective date marks the end of the federal
government's two per cent limit on the number of children with
specific learning disabilities who could be counted as handicapped
children for allocation purposes. " ' The original Act prohibited states
in their funding requests from alleging that more than twelve per
cent of their student population was handicapped, and not more than
one-sixth of this group could be labeled "learning disabled." The
basis for the statutory cap for learning disabled children was to
preclude mislabeling and overcounting in this area where a univer-
sally accepted definition is yet to be created. Despite suggestions
that the "cap" be extended, it was correctly decided that it would be
"inequitable" to single out learning disabled children when other
categories of handicapping conditions (similarly imprecise) have no
cap. Obviously it would be a travesty to set an arbitrary two per
146. 42 Fed. Reg. 65084 (1977). See also objection voiced in L. MANN, L. Gool.
MAN, J. WEIDERHOLT. TEACHING THE LEARNING DISABLED ADSOLESCENT 298 (1978).
147. 42 Fed. Reg. 65083 (1977) (to be codified as 45 C.F.R. § 121a.541(b)).
148. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
149. 42 Fed. Reg. 65083 (1977) (to be codified as 45 C.F.R. § 121a). 543(a), (b), and
(c) (1977). A written report is required by the general provision of the Act as well. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1978).
150. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.543(c) (1977).
151. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.702 (1977), amended by deleting paragraph (a2).
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cent limit when prevalent statistics among school age children in-
dicate the correct percentage might be substantially higher.
These provisions then potentially offer a substantial
breakthrough for learning disabled children. They define the com-
position and task of the evaluation team and then require a certified
report. In addition, the Act generally permits parents to get an in-
dependent evaluation and to request a hearing at which parents or
their counsel may challenge an evaluation or placement decision."'
Finally, it requires the development of a special program, which
must be "of sufficient size, scope, and quality to give reasonable pro-
mise of substantial progress."'"
Questions remain as to the enforceability of the Act and its im-
pact on litigation in this field. Although the rights created for the in-
dividual complainant under the new Act are obvious, none of the
provisions deals with the question of general attacks on the ade-
quacy of a state's program or class-action-type litigation.'" Section
1415(e) does give an aggrieved party the right to bring a civil action
in state or federal court, but this relief is apparently limited to a
single individual challenging an administrative decision. Despite
recommended changes,1 " Congress refused to comment on class ac-
tion suits or the need to exhaust administrative remedies. Obvious-
ly, simple passage of the Act, and the Congressional Declaration of
Purpose that federal assistance was necessary "to assure equal pro-
tection of the law,"15' lend support to any constitutional litigation
brought in this area. Furthermore, one key lawsuit alleging viola-
tions of the 1974 Education for the Handicapped Act, the
predecessor of the present law, illustrates the law's potential value.
In Mattie T. et aL v. Holladay,"7 a district court, in granting
summary judgment to a group of handicapped students, found that
Mississippi state officials had denied plaintiffs their rights under (a)
20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(13)(A), which provides the handicapped and their
parents procedural safeguards in the evaluation and placement pro-
152. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(bXl)(A), 1415 (b)(2), 1415 (d) (1978). 45 C.F.R.
121a.503, 508 (1977).
153. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.9 (1977).
154. Comments in the regulations indicate that questions of direct appeal to the
courts, and exhaustion of remedies, will be left to the courts. 42 Fed. Reg. 42512, 65083
(1977).
155. Id
156. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(9) (1978).
157. C.A. No. DC 75-31-S (N.D. Miss. July 28, 1977), Commerce Clearing House
24,799 (Sept. 1977).
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cess; (b) 20 U.S.C. § 1413(b)(1)(A), which requires the participating
state to locate and identify all handicapped children in the state in
need of special education services; (c) 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(13)(C), which
requires that racially and culturally non-discriminatory tests and
procedures be used in classifying and placing the handicapped; and
(d) 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(13)(B), which requires that special educational
programs be integrated into the normal school setting to the max-
imum extent appropriate. The court ordered the state defendants to
file with the court and plaintiffs their Annual Program Plan for
Fiscal Year 1978, recently submitted to the federal government
under the Education for the Handicapped Act. Plaintiffs were then
given thirty days to make suggestions or objections to the Plan
"related to the relief to be granted by the court as a result of its
ruling on the summary judgment motion."1 The court further ruled
that it would give defendants thirty days to respond to plaintiffs'
suggestions or objections and then it would issue any further orders
necessary for relief in the case.
Mattie establishes not only that an individual has a federal
cause of action under the Education of the Handicapped Act, but
also that state departments of education have the responsibility to
adopt policies, monitor local school districts and effectively enforce
compliance with the Act's requirements. In light of the subsequent
passage of the even more stringent Education of All Handicapped
Children's Act of 1975 as well as the promulgation of detailed
regulations, the importance of Mattie should not be overlooked. The
duties of the state department of education have been spelled out
explicitly in these new pieces of legislation, and Mattie establishes
that violation of these duties may be challenged in the federal
courts.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973159 prohibits discrimination
against the handicapped in any program receiving federal
assistance. Section 794, entitled "Nondiscrimination Under Federal
Grants" states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States, as defined in section 706(6) of this title,
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
158. ICE
159. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1975).
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jected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
In a key case interpreting the Act, Lloyd v. Regional Transporta-
tion,.1 the Seventh Circuit held that § 794 created both affirmative
rights to equal treatment for the handicapped and a private cause of
action to sue any federally funded entity which denied them their
rights. Of particular importance to this court was the fact that § 601
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which was held to provide a private
cause of action in Lau v. Nichols.' The court in Lloyd noted that
the legislative history of § 794 ,1U demonstrated that there was a con-
scious attempt by Congress to pattern § 794 after § 601. Congress
hoped thereby to establish a governmental policy that would pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of handicap in federally funded pro-
grams. At least two other circuits have already followed Lloyd in
holding that § 794 creates a private cause of action.'U
The plaintiffs in Lloyd asserted that their handicaps prohibited
them from utilizing the federally financed Regional Transportation
Authority in Northeastern Illinois. The law has proved to be equally
successful in challenging the denial of access to a public education.
In granting relief to a child suffering from spina bifida, the court in
Hairston v. Droscick'" noted:
The Federal statute (§794) proscribed discrimination
against individuals in any program receiving federal finan-
cial assistance. To deny a handicapped child access to a
regular public school classroom in receipt of federal finan-
cial assistance without compelling educational justification
constitutes discrimination and a denial of the benefits of
such program in violation of the statute.'
The court went on to note that financial expense was not a sufficient
justification.
And in Mattie,1 1 in addition to the state-wide violations of the
Education of the Handicapped Act, the court also found that two of
160. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1975).
161. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
162. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
163. See [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6390.
164. Cf. United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (§ 794
creates affirmative duties and gives rise to a private cause of action); Kampmeier v.
Nyquest, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977) (§ 794 creates standing to sue).
165. 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W. V. 1976).
166. Id at 184.
167. See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
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the school districts had violated § 794 of the Rehabilitation Act by
failing to provide necessary educational services to handicapped
students. Granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the
court found the students were "otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividuals" within the definition of § 794, that the school districts
received federal financial assistance, and that school officials
discriminated against the students solely because of their respective
handicaps. The court ordered school officials to individually test and
evaluate the students within twenty days to determine the educa-
tional needs of each and to provide within thirty days of the comple-
tion of the evaluation appropriate educational services.
The court in Mattie based its decision in part on newly pro-
mulgated regulations that clarify the applicability of the Act to han-
dicapped children, including the learning disabled.'" Subpart D of
the regulations deals explicitly with elementary and secondary
education. Section 84.3 defines a handicapped person as one suffer-
ing from a physical or mental impairment, "including specific learn-
ing disabilities." Section 84.4 defines discrimination as the "failure
to provide a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit or
service that is not as effective as that provided to others." More
specifically, the regulations require a recipient of federal funds to
undertake to identify and locate every qualified handicapped person
residing in its jurisdiction who is not receiving an education"9 and to
provide each with an appropriate education designed to meet his
needs "as adequately as the needs of non-handicapped persons are
met.""70 The regulations took effect June 3, 1977, and the judge in
Mattie viewed this as the deadline for providing equal educational
opportunity. The decision probably went too far in applying this
deadline to handicapped children presently in school challenging the
lack or inadequacy of special education programs since the regula-
tions provide that the September, 1978 deadline of the E.A.H.C. Act
controls except with regard to individuals totally excluded from all
educational services.' In any event the Act is critical for three
reasons: (1) at least some circuits have already found that the Act
creates affirmative rights and a private cause of action; (2) it pro-
vides a liberal definition of what constitutes an appropriate educa-
tion and (3) it applies mandatorily to all school agencies receiving
168. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 et seq. (1977) (to be codified as 45 C.F.R. Part 84). See
Section 504 and the New Civil Rights Mandates, AMICUS Vol. 2, no. 5, p. 21 (1977).
169. 42 Fed. Reg. 22682 (1977) (to be codified as 45 C.F.R. § 84.32).
170. Id. at § 84.33 (1977).
171. Id. at § 84.33(d) (1977).
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federal funding of any kind (unlike the E.A.H.C.A. which is limited
to states "desiring to participate in the program").'m In light of the
fact that practically all school districts receive funding in the form
of school lunch programs or other types of grants, the reach of this
Act is obvious.
THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE COURTS
Both the E.A.H.C.A. and the Rehabilitation Act, together with
their regulations, spell out in detail what is encompassed in the
right to a minimally adequate education for the handicapped child.
Guidelines are now available both to the advocate and to the courts
in fashioning an appropriate relief for these children. The major role
of the courts will be to assure that state recipients of federal funds
are indeed meeting their part of the bargain by providing all han-
dicapped children with an appropriate education. The fact that new
progressive laws are on the books, and that a September, 1978
deadline is fast approaching, unfortunately does not assure com-
pliance. Despite the passage of literally dozens of state special
education acts over the past decade, four million handicapped
children still remained unserved in 1975."' As several federal courts
have noted, the creation of a statute does not moot a lawsuit unless
there is good faith implementation."' Thus, for example, a recent
study in Maine noted that despite progressive state and federal
legislation, the number of unserved physically and emotionally han-
dicapped children remains at one to ten per cent in several coun-
ties."" Similarly in Indiana, despite the existence of a 1969 Special
Education Act mandating that each county develop a program serv-
ing all handicapped children by 1973,7 128 of the state's 305 school
corporations had no approved program for learning disabled
children as of the 1976-1977 school year.1 7 In the 1976 Plan submit-
ted to the U.S. Commissioner of Education to secure federal funding,
Indiana represented that by the 1977-1978 school year, 100 per cent
of all learning disabled children would be served .17 Then in its 1977
172. 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (1978). The E.A.H.C. Act probably will soon encompass all
states. See note 135 supra.
173. See [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 1432.
174. Federick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Panitch v.
Wisconsin, 371 F. Supp. 955, 959 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
175. Benjamin and Blair, Implementation of Education Laws Relating to Excep-
tional Children: The Maine Experience, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REvIEw 449 (1977).
176. IND. CODE § 20-1-6-14 (1975).
177. Answers to Interrogatories, supra note 30.
178. Indiana State Plan for Fiscal Year 1976 under Part B of the Handicapped
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Plan, the state reduced its figure to a promise that fifty per cent of
all learning disabled children would be accomodated.'" In reality, us-
ing the state's very conservative one per cent incidence rate, only
twenty-eight per cent of all learning disabled children were served
during the 1975-1976 school year ' " and that increased to only about
thirty-three per cent during the 1976-1977 school year. The role of
the court will be to see that promises are kept and that delays do
not become inordinate.
The September, 1978 deadline is fast approaching, but it is clear-
ly unlikely that the date will really mark the end of the struggle.
Several loopholes remain in the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act. Although it is perhaps unrealistic to demand that
every learning disabled child be located, evaluated and placed by
September, timetables for interim goals should be set and a court
could order recalcitrant school districts to initiate programs for
these children. Unfortunately, history has shown that schools faced
with an individual complaint but no program are first, unlikely to
classify a child as'learning disabled, and second, are highly likely to
drag their feet as much as possible. Although the Act does create an
administrative appeal process as well as judicial remedies," both
time and cost factors as well as lack of knowledge on the part of the
parents militate against the effectiveness of these forms of relief.
The Act does not provide for the appointment of counsel, litigation
expenses or the costs of procuring outside evaluations to contest the
school's action. Nor is there a damage provision anywhere in the
Act. Furthermore, the Act provides that in the interim, the child re-
mains in his current educational placement.'" Although designed to
guarantee that no child is removed from the classroom and "labeled"
before a full hearing is conducted, the provision constitutes a major
stumbling block for the parent of the learning disabled child seeking
placement in a special class or other related services. Since learning
disabilities are difficult to detect, it is often concluded that these
children are slow, immature and undisciplined and that their pro-
blems can be cured by holding them back a year in school. In the
meantime, a child may suffer irreparable harm awaiting resolution
of a complaint. What is even more likely is that few complaints will
be initiated and even fewer pursued. Again the best guarantee for
179. Indiana State Plan for Fiscal Year 1977 under Part B of the Handicapped
Act.
180. Answers to Interrogatories, supra note 30.
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(dXi) and (b)(1)(A) (1978).
182. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(eX3) (1978).
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these children would be the assurance that each school district of-
fers a complete learning disabilities program.
Another problem with the Act is the lack of guidelines as to how
a state is to satisfy its guarantee that the handicapped are identified
and located.'" The problems of the learning disabled will remain un-
solved unless methods are developed to detect this long-ignored
group of children. Despite the use of teacher and parent referrals of
potentially learning disabled children, the court in Frederick L. con-
cluded that the only effective way to locate learning disabled
children would be through mandatory screening and testing of all
students performing poorly on standardized achievement tests.1"
Neither the Act nor any of the regulations requires this type of ap-
proach.
In addition to these loopholes, the big problem with the Act is
enforcement. The Act does contain some provisions to permit public
input and to oversee a state agency's compliance. In addition to re-
quiring public hearings before a state plan is submitted or state pro-
grams and policies are adopted,'" an advisory panel consisting of
handicapped individuals, parents, educators and administrators ap-
pointed by the governor is to be delegated the tasks of gathering
data, proposing needed changes, and keeping the public informed.1"
The panel, however, has no enforcement authority."' And the only
other sanction-the termination of federal funds either to the state
agency or to a non-complying local school district-is both a drastic
and unrealistic sanction.1"
Similarly with regard to the Rehabilitation Act, the basic pro-
blem will be enforcement. The responsibility for enforcing § 504 and
its regulations lies with the HEW Office for Civil Rights. This office
is also charged with the task of enforcing nondiscrimination laws,
and it already has three court orders issued against it to fulfill its
responsibility in other civil rights areas as well as a backlog of ap-
proximately 3,025 civil rights complaints.'" Thus there is concern
183. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2XA-C) (1978).
184. See note 69 supra.
185. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412 (2XE), 1412(7) (1978).
186. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(aX12) (1978).
187. See Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children" A
Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.P. 1016, 1072. 1077 (1976).
188. H.E.W. can terminate funding to non-complying states, 20 U.S.C. § 1416
(1978), and both the United States Commissioner of Education and the state educa-
tional agency have the power to terminate funding to local school districts. 20 U.S.C. §
1414(bX2) (1978).
189. See Carroll, NCLH Point of View, AMIcus vol. 2, No. 5, 36-7 (1977).
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that even with the long awaited promulgation of regulations, en-
forcement will not soon follow. The individual complainant, at least
in some circuits, now has access to the federal courts via § 504; but
still the effectiveness of this type of piecemeal litigation is ques-
tionable.
No doubt the greatest immediate impact of this legislation will
be to bolster the dozens of right-to-education lawsuits presently pen-
ding in state and federal courts across the country. Courts added
under these acts lend strong support to the claims for an adequate
education for handicapped children. Much of the uncertainty as to
the scope and meaning of this right has been eliminated. The states
now have clearly delineated duties as far as the types of services
and the procedural safeguards that they must provide to learning
disabled chldren and their parents. If a state is in fact complying
with federal law, it will have a detailed plan for the identification,
evaluation and placement of learning disabled children. If it is not
acting with sufficient speed and efficiency in implementing its plan,
the courts should step in and mandate that it does. Only in this way
can the gap between the legislative promise and the present dismal
reality of these children be bridged.
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